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The proper management of privacy and security constraints in information systems
in general and access control in particular constitute a tremendous, but still preva-
lent challenge. Role-based access control (RBAC) and its variations can be considered
as the widely adopted approach to realize authorization in information systems. How-
ever, RBAC lacks a proper object-specific support, which disallows establishing the fine-
grained access control required in many domains. By comparison, attribute-based access
control (ABAC) enables a fine-grained access control based on policies and rules eval-
uating attributes. As a drawback, ABAC lacks the abstraction of roles. Moreover, it is
challenging to engineer and to audit the granted privileges encoded in rule-based poli-
cies. This paper presents the generic approach of object-specific role-based access control
(ORAC). On one hand, ORAC enables information system engineers, administrators and
users to utilize the well-known principle of roles. On the other, ORAC allows realizing
the access to objects in a fine-grained way where required. The approach was system-
atically established according to well-elicited key requirements for fine-grained access
control in information systems. For the purpose of evaluation, the approach was applied
to real-world scenarios and implemented in a proof-of-concept prototype demonstrating
its feasibility and applicability.
Keywords: object-specific role-based access control, access control, authorization, role-
based access control, instance-specific access control
1. Introduction
Information systems are today’s key technology to automate business processes as
well as to offer related products and services to customers, employees, and other
stakeholders. For enterprise information systems, sophisticated access control to
business processes, business functions, and business objects is indispensable to en-
sure information integrity, privacy and availability. Access control has therefore
always been a key concern for information system engineers and researchers27,26,
and numerous approaches with specific pros and cons have been proposed in
the literature26. Especially, role-based access control (RBAC)25,7 and attribute-
based access control (ABAC) 13,10 as well as numerous variants of these two
approaches9,2,4,1,8,15,11,13,30 have been in the focus of both practitioners and re-
searchers for a long time.
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1.1. Problem Statement
As of today, RBAC is still the most widely used access control paradigm whose
ease of use and manageability are appreciated by information system engineers and
administrators5. In particular, the resources and application functions, which may
be accessed by users filling a specific role, can be easily determined at both design
and run time. As a drawback, contemporary RBAC approaches do not allow for fine-
grained, object-specific access control that considers, for example, the ownership of
existing data objects in an information system as well as the relationship between
these objects.
Example 1.1. (Patient Treatment Processes) In a hospital information
system, digital patient records with their various subordinated objects (e.g.,
medical findings, therapy plans) are managed digitally. A subject with role
physician should be only allowed to access those patient records (including
the connected objects) he or she is responsible for in order to prevent security
issues and to meet privacy requirements.
Based on traditional RBAC, role physician would be granted access to all pa-
tient records. To cope with scenarios as the one presented in Example 1.1, roles
are typically specialized (e.g., physician working in women hospital). On one hand,
this allows for a more fine-grained access control. On the other, the number of roles
rapidly grows, making role maintenance hardly manageable over time and, thus,
hampering scalability. Additionally, RBAC does not allow specifying that a role
owner may only access a specific object with all its subordinated objects (e.g., a
medical record with findings and therapy plans). Moreover, as the assignments of
users to specific roles are often integrated with the source code of an information
system, the introduction of new roles might require a new information system re-
lease. Finally, to properly support scenarios like the one from Example 1.1, a specific
role would have to be created for every single patient (e.g., physician of John Doe).
By contrast, ABAC does not rely on any specified roles with linked privileges13.
Instead, access privileges are dynamically acquired by virtue of attributes shared by
the subject, who wants to gain access, and the requested resource. To realize access
control, usually, ABAC-based information systems rely on a large set of policy rules,
which are jointly set up and maintained by domain experts and security engineers.
At run time, these rules are continuously evaluated to properly handle access re-
quests. In comparison to RBAC, however, ABAC suffers from its fine granularity.
The definition of policy rules constitutes a sophisticated task due to the complex
data structures comprising many attributes on one hand and the evolution of these
structures over time on the other. Due to the complex structure of the policies,
in addition, it is challenging to derive the actual set of privileges a certain user or
group of users (i.e., role) shall obtain15,5. Finally, with ABAC, it is by far not trivial
to define rules enabling a hierarchical access to interconnected objects as discussed
in the context of Example 1.1 (e.g., a medical record with findings).
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Overall, both RBAC and ABAC do not always provide the necessary support
required to realize object-specific access control. In particular, there exists no fine-
grained, role-based access control approach that properly integrates the given data
structure and concurrently allows determining risk exposure adequately.
1.2. Contribution
This paper introduces object-specific role-based access control (ORAC),
which enables information system engineers and administrators to jointly establish
and manage fine-grained, role-based access control as required in many application
domains. In particular, subjects may only perform object-specific actions they are
allowed to access, based on object-specific roles and corresponding role assignments.
For example, a physician may only read and update the records of those patients
he is responsible for. In addition, ORAC allows expressing hierarchical access on
the child objects of an object. For example, if a physician has access to a patient
record, he may access all therapy plans linked to that patient record as well.
To evaluate the feasibility and applicability of ORAC, the approach was applied
in two case studies with specific application scenarios. Furthermore, an advanced
proof-of-concept prototype was developed. Using the latter, we were able to show
that the definition of privileges can be intuitively integrated into the information
system development process through (method) annotations, increasing the trans-
parency and explicitness of access privileges at design time.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2 introduces a real-
world scenario and defines key terms needed for understanding this work. Section 3
then discusses fundamental use cases and key requirements for ORAC. In Section 4,
an overview of the ORAC approach is given and its key components are presented.
Section 5 addresses the process of establishing and enforcing object-specific role-
based access control. In Section 6, the proof-of-concept prototype as well as two
case studies are presented to evaluate the applicability of ORAC. Related work is
discussed in Section 7. Finally, Section 8 concludes the paper and gives an outlook.
2. Backgrounds
This section introduces key terms required for understanding this work. To illustrate
issues that emerge when coping with access control on complex data structures, a
real-world scenario, which we elaborated in prior work17,18, is introduced first. To
ease the understanding of ORAC, the scenario is used as a running example.
Example 2.1. (Recruiting Processes) In a recruitment process, appli-
cants may apply for a job offer defined by a manager of a functional division.
Once an application has been submitted by an applicant, the responsible re-
cruiter in the human resource (HR) department is notified. The overall process
goal is to decide which applicant shall get the job. If an application is ineligi-
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ble (e.g., formal requirements are not met), the applicant will be immediately
rejected. By contrast, the recruiter may request one or more internal reviews
for each applicant. Based on the reviews, the recruiter decides on the applica-
tions and will initiate further steps, e.g., interviews with selected applicants. To
document the interviews, minutes are created and linked to the corresponding
applications. At the end of this process, the recruiter may create a contract
offer for an applicant. If the latter agrees with the offer, subsequent processes
will be triggered afterwards. Alternatively, a contract may be offered to other
applicants, or the entire recruitment process may have to be started once more.
2.1. Objects and Models
The scenario introduced in Example 2.1 confirms that subjects with specific roles
(e.g., recruiter) may deal with a variety of interconnected objects of different ob-
ject types28. In the scope of the recruitment process object, for example, dozens of
objects of type application may be submitted (and, thereby, created) by applicants
individually. Moreover, every application object may be linked to several objects of
type review. As a consequence, fine-grained access control needs to be integrated
with the given data model and be adopted to it. In particular, access control should
take into account that, at run time, the subjects interacting with the information
system dynamically create complex graphs of objects based on the given data model.
To properly design, enact and implement an object-specific role-based access
control in information systems, first of all, four relevant terms are sketched in the
following: object types, objects, object models, and object model instances. An object
type corresponds to a data structure that determines the structure of an object by
defining a set of attributes. The latter, in turn, are defined by a data type (e.g.,
String) and a name. Every object exactly references one object type and features
values for the attributes of the object type. Figure 1 illustrates a sample application
object type (a) with corresponding application objects (b).
Application
- Long ID
- String applicantName
- Date applicationDate
- ...
Application of Kevin Smith
- 6841
- Kevin Smith
- 06/01/2018 16:10:45
- ...
Application of Kevin Smith
- 6841
- Kevin Smith
- 06/01/2018 16:10:45
- ...
Application of Kevin Smith
- Long ID: 6841
- String applicantName: Kevin Smith
- Date applicationDate: 06/01/2018 16:10:45
- ...
a) Object Type OT b) Corresponding Objects Oi
references
Fig. 1: Sample Object Type with corresponding Objects
To consider the relationship between object types and objects, object models
and object model instances need to be discussed next: An object model consists of
finite sets of object types and corresponding relationship types. Each relationship
type connects a source object type with a target object type, and further specifies
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a minimum and a maximum cardinality. At run time, an object model may be used
to create object model instances. An object model instance, in turn, consists of two
finite sets of objects and object relations, of which each either refers to an object
type or a relation type of the underlying object model. Fig. 2 illustrates an object
model with a corresponding object model instance related to Example 2.1 (for the
sake of readability, possible attributes of the object types are omitted).
1 : [0-∞)
[0-1] : 1 1 : [0-∞)
1 : [1-∞) 1 : [0-∞)
1 : [0-1]
1 : [0-∞)
...
Job Offer
Recruitment Process
Application Contract Offer
Interview MinutesReview
a) Object Model b) Corresponding Object Model Instance
Job Offer "Sales Manager"
Recruitment Process #181
...
Application of Kevin Smith
Review of Kevin Smith's 
application
Application of Kevin S ithApplication of Kevin Smith
Review of Kevin Smith's 
application
Fig. 2: Sample Object Model with corresponding Object Model Instance
Example 2.1 and Fig. 2 highlight that objects may depend on other objects,
e.g., a recruitment process object type may be in a parental relationship to the
job offer, application, and contract offer object types. Consequently, application
objects should be automatically deleted when removing its parental object with
type recruitment process (i.e., cascading delete). Note that such knowledge about
parental relationships between object types is crucial for enabling an object-specific
access control.
2.2. Subjects, Actions and Privileges
Subjects, actions, and privileges are fundamental concepts of any access control
approach. Subjects are considered as users or technical agents (e.g., client appli-
cation) interacting with implemented business processes, business functions, and
data objects of an information system. In turn, users–as subjects–may belong to
organizational units (e.g., HR department) and obtain organizational roles (e.g.,
recruiter). Note that this organizational context becomes crucial as soon as access
shall be granted to a set of subjects (cf. Section 4).
When ensuring access control at run time, it needs to be checked whether sub-
jects may perform specific actions (cf. Fig. 3). For example, an action may create
a new object, change its attributes, or remove an object from its parental object.
Hence, actions are often performed with respect to specific objects. Note that in
object-oriented programming languages, actions are usually represented as class
methods, e.g., manipulating the attributes of an object or calculating a desired
result based on several objects.
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Finally, a privilege denotes the right to perform one or more specific actions.
Typically, a privilege is granted to a subject directly or indirectly through, for
example, an organizational role assigned to the subject. An action, in turn, may
require several privileges granted to the subject. The other way round, a certain
privilege may be connected to several actions (i.e., n:m relationship). To enforce ac-
cess control at run time, dedicated algorithms determine whether a subject obtains
one or more privileges required to perform an action.
Object Model Instance
Review of Ina Kent's application
Recruitment Process #181
Application
Job Offer "Sales Manager"
...
ApplicationApplicationApplication of Kevin Smith
Review of Kevin Smith's application
Action
  name: addApplicationToRecProcess
  context: recruitmentProcess #181
  target: new Application of John Doe
Privilege
  context: RecruitmentProcess OT
  target: Application OT
  type: ADDING
requires
applied on
Subject
wants to 
perform
obtains??
Fig. 3: Relationship between Subjects, Actions and Privileges
3. Requirements
To systematically develop object-specific role-based access control, we thor-
oughly analyzed access control scenarios in various application domains, including
healthcare21,24, human resource management19,16, and automotive engineering22,29.
In case studies conducted in these domains, we encountered various challenges that
had resulted from the lack of an object-specific role-based access control.
To elaborate the requirements, first of all, we analyzed the different types of
actions performed on objects in the considered scenarios. Based on this analysis,
we derived and defined action use cases (cf. Section 3.1), providing the necessary
basis for specifying the different privileges required for a fine-grained access control
(cf. Fig. 3). Furthermore, the action use cases foster the general understanding of
the dynamic interactions between subjects and the data model of the information
system. In this context, we further analyzed in which sequence the different user
groups had performed the actions on the objects, what results of the performed
actions had been generated, and what restrictions had been put in place (e.g., users
of group A may only access specific objects they own). Finally, these insights were
aggregated in a set of key requirements regarding the development of an object-
specific role-based access control.
3.1. Action Use Cases
The following action use cases (AUCs) highlight different action types that may be
performed on objects in an object model instance. The proper understanding of the
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action types is important: The privileges required to perform actions shall reflect
the semantics of the actions in order to enable sound access control decisions. While
Table 1 depicts essential action use cases for objects (i.e., to create, read, update,
or delete objects), Table 2 introduces more sophisticated action use cases.
Table 1: Basic Action Use Cases
ID and Name Effects on the Information System Level
AUC01
Add object
A subject adds a new object to a parental object or to the root-
level of the object model instance. For example, an applicant may
create/submit an application, which is then added to a specific
recruitment process.
AUC02
Read object
A subject may read an entire object including its attributes. For
example, an applicant should be able to read his application.
AUC03
Read object
attribute(s)
A subject may read a subset of the object attributes. For example,
an employee of a functional division may only view a partial set of
the attributes of an application.
AUC04
Read objects
A subject may retrieve a set of child objects of a given parental ob-
ject. For example, a recruiter may want to retrieve all applications
of a specific recruitment process.
AUC05
Read objects with
subset of their
attributes
In addition to AUC04, a subject may retrieve a set of objects with
only a subset of attributes. For example, an employee of a func-
tional division may view the applications of a recruitment process,
but the applications must not be displayed in all (personal) details.
AUC06
Update object
A subject wants to update an object, i.e., its attributes. Thereby,
the access shall not be restricted to a subset of object attributes
(compare AUC07); instead, all attributes may be updated. For ex-
ample, a recruiter may want to update a contract offer over time.
AUC07
Update object
attributes
A subject may only update a specified subset of the object’s at-
tributes. For example, an applicant may only update certain parts
of his application after having submitted it initially.
AUC08
Remove object
A subject may remove an object from its parental object(s). For
example, a recruiter may delete a review (from the recruitment
process) not being accurate enough.
Regarding privilege-based access control, one of the key challenges is to deter-
mine the appropriate granularity for defining privileges as well as to establish a
meaningful privilege classification to ease the allocation of privileges in general. If
the classification is too fine-grained and privileges become too detailed, one can
hardly allocate privileges to roles and, consequently, to subjects. If privileges and
their classification are too coarse-grained, in turn, the expressiveness of the access
control approach will be limited in general.
We took the action use cases depicted in Tables 1 and 2 as basis for deriving a
handy set of 12 different types of privileges (cf. Section 4.2). Though the proposed
set of action types might be not complete for covering access control in all kind of
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information systems, they can be considered as an important foundation or even
be used as templates to derive action types and, finally, types of privileges for a
specific information system currently being under development.
Table 2: Advanced Action Use Cases
ID and Name Effects on the Information System Level
AUC09
Link object to
another object
A subject may create a non-parental relationship between two ob-
jects ox, oy ∈ Oall with ox 6= oy and oy not being a subordinated
object of ox. For example, a recruiter may link a contract offer to
a specific application.
AUC10
Unlink object from
another object
A subject may remove a non-parental relationship between an ob-
ject ox ∈ Oall and another object oy ∈ Oall, which was established
previously by applying AUC09. For example, a recruiter may re-
move a link between a contract offer and an application.
AUC11
Search objects
A subject may search for objects with object type otx ∈ OTall
matching the given search parameters. In this context, one needs
to consider AUC02 and AUC03, as subjects may only retrieve ob-
jects (and read corresponding attributes) for which access has been
granted to them. For example, an employee may look for an ap-
plication with certain properties. However, she may only retrieve
selected applications and, in addition, access only a subset of the
attributes of the selected applications.
AUC12
Perform
complex action
A subject may perform a complex action, which cannot be clas-
sified according to the action use cases AUC01-AUC11. The com-
plex action is performed in respect to a given object ox ∈ Oall
and its subordinated objects ox+1, ox+2, . . . , ox+n. For example, a
recruiter may execute an analysis function providing performance
indicators related to the recruitment process (e.g., process time).
3.2. Key Requirements
To establish a solid base for object-specific role-based access control, we elicited
key requirements based on the insights from prior case studies conducted in the
aforementioned application areas.
R01: User Sovereignty—The users of an information system, i.e. its subjects,
shall be enabled to manage the key aspects of the access control approach them-
selves. Amongst others, this includes the allocation of privileges related to object(s)
to other users. This allocation, in turn, needs to be accomplished in a safe and con-
trolled way (e.g., through predefined roles “bundling” privileges). Finally, to ensure
that a user may only grant those privileges to other users he or she obtains, an
approval process is required.
R02: Definition of Privileges—The definition, integration and management
of a large set of privileges in information systems constitutes a costly and error-
prone task. Hence, it is highly desirable to ease this process and to homogenize the
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set of created privileges (cf. Section 3.1). In particular, the defined privileges should
correspond to the business functions of an information system (i.e., actions), and
be definable by developers in a controlled and intuitive manner.
R03: System-specific Roles—Organizations usually use roles to describe func-
tions performed by several individuals. For example, a subject sMichael heading the
HR department may obtain the organizational role of a director. As discussed,
however, organizational roles are often not fine-grained enough to grant access to
an information system. For example, subject sMichael may obtain several system-
specific roles in an information system: he may act as recruiter, as an applicant (as
he might internally apply for a job as well), and as a manager in the context of dif-
ferent recruitment processes or applications. Thus, system-specific roles are required
to additionally enhance and refine existing organizational roles (cf. Section 2.2).
R04: Object-specific Role Assignments—System-specific roles need to be
assignable to concrete objects of an object model instance. In particular, a system-
specific role is only valid if it references existing objects. Hence, a subject may obtain
a system-specific role in relation to a set of objects the role shall provide privileges
for. Consequently, a subject may obtain various system-specific roles, which are
object-specifically assigned in an information system employing object-specific role-
based access control.
R05: Hierarchical Privileges—In general, a particular object may always have
several child objects (cf. Section 2.1). For example, a recruitment process object
may have a set of dynamically added application objects, which shall be always
accessible by subjects owning the object-specific role recruiter. As a consequence,
subjects may require hierarchical privileges for all child objects of a specific object.
This way, it is ensured that newly created child objects may be properly accessed
(without additional need to reference them explicitly after their creation).
R06: Customizable Roles—In response to domain-specific requirements,
system-specific roles shall be customizable for privileged users at run time as well.
For example, an administrator of an HR system may want to remove a privilege
(e.g., update of the application) granted to applicants. Another use case concerns
the implementation of new features in an information system. In the latter context,
roles need to be created and adjusted in order to incorporate the privileges coming
along with the new features.
R07: Semi-Automatic Role Assignments—System-specific roles need to be
assignable as convenient as possible. As a characteristic use case consider the cre-
ation of an object. Often, the creator of an object should automatically perceive
a set of privileges (object-ware role) related to this object. For example, if a user
of an HR system creates a recruitment process object (and thereby starts the cor-
responding recruitment process), she should be automatically assigned to the role
of a recruiter in relation to this object in order to be able to manage the process
properly. Furthermore, in case a subject wants to assign a role to another one, she
shall only retrieve the roles assignable in this situation.
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4. Object-specific Role-based Access Control
To address the key requirements for a fine-grained, role-based access control (cf. Sec-
tion 3) and to overcome the drawbacks of existing approaches (cf. Sections 1 and 7),
we developed the approach of object-specific role-based access control (ORAC). In
particular, the latter enables the fine-grained integration of role-based access con-
trol with a given object model. To ease the understanding of the ORAC approach,
first of all, we provide an overview of the overall approach and, especially, discuss
the interplay of the key ORAC components (cf. Fig. 4). Based on these insights,
the ORAC components are presented in detail in the following in order to establish
a deep understanding of the approach and its benefits.
Object-aware
Role
bject-a are
Role
AgentsAgents
Organiza�onal Units
Organiza�onal Roles
Abili�es
Object-aware
Role Assignment
Object-specific
Role
Guarded
Object Instance
Abili�esAbility
Organiza�onal RolesOrganiza�onal Role
rganiza�onal UnitsOrganiza�onal Unit
Object-a are
Role Assign ent
Object-specific
Role Assignment
keyScope addScopeaddScope
PermissionPer issionPrivilegePermissionPer issionPrivilege PermissionPer issionPrivilege
uarded
bject Insta ce
Guarded
Object Instance
uarded
bject Instance
Guarded Object 
(of Type B)
Guarded
Object Instance
uarded
bject Instance
Guarded Object 
(of Type C)
...
... ...
keyScope Guarded Object 
(of Type A)
addScope
addScope
Regarding Guarded
Object Type A
Regarding Guarded
Object Type B
Regarding Guarded
Object Type C
Regarding Guarded
Object Type N
gent
...
Fig. 4: Object-Specific Role-Based Access Control in a Nutshell
In a nutshell, the ORAC approach provides guarded objects, privileges, object-
specific roles (cf. Requirements R03 and R06), organizational entities, agents, and
object-specific role assignments (cf. Requirement R04) as key components.
Objects, whose access is controlled by ORAC, are denoted as guarded objects.
Thus, an action manipulating a guarded object is only accessible for agents who
have been granted access to this action before. Interacting with an ORAC-based in-
formation system, agents may either be humans (i.e., a user) or robots (e.g., another
system). In turn, organizational entities allow modeling the organizational context
of agents. More precisely, there exist organizational units (e.g., HR department),
organizational roles (e.g., director), and abilities (e.g., office skills).
In general, organizational units may be hierarchically organized to cover common
organizational structures as they can be found in enterprises. In addition, every
organizational unit (e.g., HR department) may further entail several organization
roles (e.g., head of department). Each organizational role, in turn, may be linked to
a set of agents acting in this organizational role. Finally, abilities (e.g., office skills)
allow grouping and selecting agents across different organizational units based on
their skills. In summary, organizational entities may be used to increase the number
February 2, 2019 21:22 Object-specific Role-based Access Control docu-
ment
Object-specific Role-based Access Control 11
of options for assigning agents to object-specific roles.
Object-specific role assignments, in turn, constitute the key component of ORAC,
tying together agents (directly or indirectly through organizational entities), object-
specific roles, and guarded objects. In particular, the purpose of an object-specific
role assignment is to specify that one or more agents obtain an object-specific role
in relation to one or multiple guarded objects. In this respect, every object-specific
role entails a key scope and, optionally, multiple additional scopes. These scopes
are used to specify that certain privileges are only granted in relation to guarded
objects of pre-defined guarded object types. Furthermore, the scopes determine the
way object-specific role assignments are created: at run time, an object-specific role
may be assigned to one or several guarded objects matching the pre-defined scopes
of the object-specific role. The privileges, which are linked to the respective scope,
are then evaluated only in relation to the selected guarded object and, if specified,
its child objects.
Example 4.1. (Object-specific Role Recruiter) An object-specific role
recruiter shall only be assigned to guarded objects of type recruitment process.
Hence, the key scope of role recruiter refers to guarded object type recruitment
process. For a particular agent, e.g. aLisa, who is supposed to obtain the role
of a recruiter with respect to a recruitment process object, an object-specific
role assignment is then created. This role assignment interconnects aLisa, the
object-specific role recruiter (via its key scope), and a specific guarded object
of type recruitment process.
Based on object-specific roles and role assignments, the set of actions an agent
may perform on a guarded object can be accurately granted and restricted, respec-
tively. To facilitate the assignment of privileges to object-specific roles as well as to
establish an effective object-specific access control, each privilege is classified by an
action type (cf. Section 3.1), which obtains a pre-specified scope as well. In addition,
to allow for the hierarchical application of privileges (cf. Section 3, Requirement
R05), an object-specific role may reference a set of object-related privileges as well
as a set of hierarchical privileges for every scope separately.
Example 4.2. (Privileges of the Object-specific Role Recruiter) The
object-specific role recruiter has a key scope targeting the guarded object type
recruitment process. In turn, the key scope is linked to privileges for updating
a recruitment process as well as to various hierarchical privileges for managing
child (guarded) objects of type application. Hence, an agent assigned to the
object-specific role recruiter and a recruitment process guarded object may
then manage all guarded child application objects of the recruitment process.
To finally enforce access control with respect to a certain action to be performed
on a guarded object, first of all, the object-specific role assignments referring to the
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guarded object are considered. It is checked whether the given role assignments are
linked to the respective agent and to an object-specific role the required privilege has
been assigned to. If this applies, access will be granted immediately. Alternatively,
the object-specific role assignments, referencing the parental guarded objects of
the initially considered one (cf. Section 4.1), and the current agent are considered
stepwise to check whether access can be granted anyhow.
To illustrate the following discussion, Fig. 5 depicts the scenario introduced
in Section 2 with corresponding ORAC components. Sections 4.1–4.4 present the
fundamental concepts of guarded objects, privileges, object-specific roles, and object-
specific role assignments in detail. Section 5 then discusses the algorithms necessary
to enforce ORAC at run time, highlighting the interplay of the ORAC components.
addScope
Object-aware
Role
bject-a are
Role
AgentsAgents
Organiza�onal Units
Organiza�onal Roles
Abili�es
Manager
Guarded
Object Instance
Abili�esOffice Skills
Organiza�onal RolesDirector
rganiza�onal UnitsSales Department
keyScope addScopeaddScope
PermissionPer issionPrivilege READPermissionPer issionPrivilege READ PermissionPer issionPrivilege READ
uarded
bject Insta ce
Guarded
Object Instance
uarded
bject InstanceJob Offer
Guarded
Object Instance
uarded
bject Instance
KeyScope Recruitment Process
addScope
Regarding 
Recruiting Process
Regarding
Job Offer
Regarding 
Application
John Kane
...
Guarded
Object Instance
uarded
bject I sta c
Applica�on
Interview Minutes
Object-specific
Role Assignment
Fig. 5: Object-specific Role-based Access Control applied to Application Scenario
4.1. Guarded Objects
To establish object-specific role-based access control, it is essential to differentiate
between objects protected by access control and those that may be accessed without
any restrictions. Therefore, guarded objects shall denote objects whose access is
protected based on ORAC. Furthermore, to support the hierarchical application
of privileges (cf. Requirement R05), the relationship between guarded objects has
to be taken into account as well. To meet Requirement R05, it becomes crucial to
determine the parental guarded objects of a particular guarded object at run time
to properly enforce ORAC.
In this context, a peculiarity of object relationships in object model instances
need to be discussed: an object of a specific object type may have multiple parental
objects. Example 4.3 and Fig. 6 illustrate this issue.
Example 4.3. (Multiple Parental Objects) Objects of object type doc-
ument are subordinated to objects of types application and job offer. Addi-
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tionally, a particular object of type document, e.g., a document containing
regulations, may be child of different contract offer objects. Hence, document
objects may have two or more parental objects.
ApplicationApplication
ApplicationApplicationCV John (Document) Regulations (Document)Amendment (Document)
Contract Offer Lisa HoeContract Offer John Smith
Recruitment Process #15
Application John Smith
Fig. 6: Example of an Object with two Parents
In general, each guarded object may have an arbitrary number of child and
parental guarded objects. Accordingly, Definition 4.1 formally introduces guarded
objects types and guarded objects including the notion of parental guarded objects.
Definition 4.1. (Guarded Object Type and Guarded Object) Let OTall
be the set of all object types and Oall be the set of all objects.
(a) A guarded object type got is an object type protected by ORAC. With
GOTall denoting the set of all guarded object types, a guarded object type
is defined as a tuple got = (ot, parentGOT ) ∈ GOTall, where
• ot ∈ OTall is a object type,
• parentGOT : GOTall → P(GOTall) is a function returning the parental
guarded object types of got.
(b) A guarded object go is an object protected by ORAC. With GOall denoting
the set of all guarded objects, a guarded object is defined as a tuple go =
(got, o, parentGO) ∈ GOall, where
• got = (ot, parentGOT ) is the guarded object type of go,
• o ∈ Oall is a object of type ot embedded in go,
• parentGO : GOall → P(GOall) is a function returning the parental
guarded objects of go.
Note that ORAC excludes the creation of cycles when defining the parental
relationships in a object modela. Furthermore, agents and all kinds of organizational
entities may be represented as guarded object types as well. In this context, use
cases like updating personal user data or establishing an organizational model can
be supported as well.
aA cycle of parental relationships would rule out the hierarchical application of privileges
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4.2. Privileges
Privileges denote the right to perform one or multiple actions on a guarded ob-
ject, and are required to safely check access at run time. When a subject obtains
a privilege in relation to a guarded object based on an object-specific role (cf. Sec-
tion 4.3) and a corresponding object-specific role assignment (cf. Section 4.4), access
is granted and the action may be performed. To make privileges as accurate and
meaningful as required and to properly allocate them to the scope of an object-
specific role, every privilege has an action name, an action type (cf. Section 3.1)
denoting the purpose of the privilege, and a scope. Shaped together by a target
and context guarded object type, the privilege scope specifies the objects the re-
spective privilege may be applied to. Thereby, the context guarded object type is a
possible parental guarded object type of the target object type (see parentGOT of
Definition 4.1). Definition 4.2 formally introduces privileges.
Definition 4.2. (Privilege) A privilege p ∈ Pall is defined as a tuple
p = (actionName, actionType, targetGOT, contextGOT ), where
• actionName is the name of the action, p is granting,
• actionType ∈ {READ,READ ATTRIBUTE,ADD,ADD LINK
UPDATE,UPDATE ATTRIBUTE,REMOV E,REMOV E LINK,
LISTING, SEARCH,ADV ANCED} is the action type of p,
• targetGOT ∈ GOTall is the target guarded object type of p,
• contextGOT ∈ GOTall is the context guarded object type of p,
Pall denotes the set of all privileges.
To illustrate Definition 4.2, Table 3b provides examples of privileges whose defini-
tions refer to the action use cases (presented in Section 3.1) as well as the application
scenario introduced in Section 2.
Table 3: Exemplary Privileges
ActionName ActionType TargetGOT ContextGOT
addRecruitmentProcess ADD RecProcess HR System
. . . . . . . . . . . .
getJobOffer READ Job Offer Job Offer
getTitle READ ATTRIBUTE Job Offer Job Offer
setTitle UPDATE ATTRIBUTE Job Offer Job Offer
removeJobOffer REMOVE Job Offer RecProcess
. . . . . . . . . . . .
addApplication ADD Application RecProcess
LinkApplication-
ToContractOffer
ADD LINK Application ContractOffer
. . . . . . . . . . . .
bDue to space limitations, RecProcess abbreviates the recruitment process guarded object type
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4.3. Object-specific Roles
To ensure the proper assignment of privileges to agents and guarded objects as well
as to provide system-specific roles (cf. Requirement R03), we propose the use of
object-specific roles bundling privileges in relation to specified scopes. As object-
specific roles can be safely specified, the assignment of privileges to meaningful
object-specific roles is well conductible by eligible subjects (e.g., administrators;
cf. Requirement R06). By using scopes in object-specific roles, ORAC enables the
hierarchical access of child guarded objects (cf. Requirement R05) as well as the
coverage of more sophisticated access control use cases (cf. Example 4.4).
Definition 4.3 introduces object-specific roles formally.
Definition 4.3. (Object-specific Role) Let gotList = (GOTtrace, order) be a
tuple denoting a list of guarded object types, where
• GOTtrace ⊆ P(GOTall) is a set of guarded object types,
• order : GOTtrace → N is an ordering function assigning a unique number to
every got ∈ GOTtrace.
Let further GOTList be the set of all possible lists of guarded object types.
Then: An object-specific role osr ∈ OSRall is defined as a tuple
osr = (P, SC, keySC,AddSC, scpsc, scphi, scpParams,OSRreq), where
• P ⊆ Pall is the set of privileges referenced by osr,
• SC ⊂ GOTall×GOTList is the set of scopes comprised by osr. Every sc ∈ SC
corresponds to a tuple sc = (targetGOT, contextGOTList), where
– targetGOT ∈ GOTall is the target guarded object type,
– contextGOTList ∈ GOTList is a list of contextual, parental guarded object
types.
• keySC ∈ SC is the key scope of osr,
• AddSC ⊂ SC,∀addSC ∈ AddSC : addSC 6= keySC is the set of additional
scopes; the target guarded object type of keySC must be part of every list
of contextual, parental guarded object types of the additional scopes,
• scpsc : SC → P(P ) assigns a set of scope-specific privileges Psc ⊆ Posr to
each scope sc ∈ SC,
• scphi : SC → P(P ) assigns a set of hierarchical privileges Phi ⊆ Posr to each
scope sc ∈ SC,
• scpParams : SC → P(Params) is a function assigning a set of parameters
Params ⊆ {OnCreationDefault, OnGrantDefault, ScopeManager} to
every scope sc ∈ SC,
• OSRreq ⊂ OSRall with ∀osry ∈ OSRreq : osry 6= osr is a set of required
context roles.
Finally, OSRall denotes the set of all object-specific roles.
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Definition 4.3 shows that an object-specific role may have different sets of priv-
ileges associated with different scopes—the key scope and the additional ones. The
key scope is crucial. In order to create an object-specific role assignment (cf. Sec-
tion 4.4), the key scope must be set up properly and, therefore, a guarded object
has to be chosen matching this scope (with its guarded object type).
Example 4.4. (Key Scope) The object-specific role manager (cf. Fig. 5)
features a key scope referencing the guarded object type recruitment process. In
order to assign the object-specific role manager, therefore, a concrete guarded
object of type recruitment process has to be chosen as reference for the key
scope. Moreover, appropriate guarded objects of type application may be se-
lected for the additional scope of the given object-specific role.
To enable agents to access actions on referenced guarded objects, every scope is
linked to two sets of privileges: the first one contains privileges directly related to
the referenced guarded object (realized by scpsc) in Definition 4.3; e.g., this set may
contain privileges to read or update the guarded object. By contrast, the second set
contains privileges that are hierarchically applicable to the child guarded objects of
the referenced one (realized by scphi).
Example 4.5. (Hierarchical Privileges and Additional Scope) Agents
with object-specific role manager shall be able to access the guarded objects of
types recruitment process and job offer (cf. Fig. 5), but may only access selected
application guarded objects shared by a recruiter (cf. Section 2) on purpose.
Hence, the object-specific role manager features the key scope recruitment pro-
cess with privileges regarding guarded objects of types recruitment process and
job offer. Moreover, manager has an additional scope with privileges pertaining
guarded objects of type application.
Every object-specific role osrx ∈ OSRall may feature a set of required contextual
object-specific roles (OSRreq ⊂ OSRall) to ensure that it can be correctly assigned
at run time. During the latter, an object-specific role will only be assigned to an
agent and a guarded object gox ∈ GOall, if the agent is already part of an object-
specific role assignment referring to an object-specific role osrreq ∈ OSRreq and a
parental guarded object of gox (cf. Section 4.4 for details).
Parameters OnCreationDefault, OnGrantDefault, and ScopeManager are
used to allow for automated creations, controlled recommendations, and proper as-
signments of object-specific roles to agents and guarded objects during run time.
The details of how to use parameter scpParams are explained in Section 4.4. Fi-
nally, creating, updating and removing object-specific roles can be controlled by
considering object-specific roles as guarded objects as well. In this way, ORAC
additionally supports the controlled and secured adaptations of its own entities.
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4.4. Object-specific Role Assignments
Tying together agents, organizational entities, object-specific roles, and guarded
objects, object-specific role assignments play the key role in enabling ORAC (cf.
Requirement R01 and R04). To establish a sound understanding, Definition 4.4
formally introduces object-specific role assignments.
Definition 4.4. (Object-specific Role Assignment) An object-specific role
assignment is defined as a tuple osra = (A,OE, osr,GO, scgo) where
• A ⊆ Aall is a set of agents,
• OE ⊆ OEall is a set of organizational entities,
• osr = (P, SC, keySC,AddSC, scpsc, scphi, scpParams,OSRreq) ∈ OSRall
is a object-specific role,
• GO ⊆ GOall is a set of guarded objects,
• scgo : SC → P(GOall) is a function that assigns a set of guarded objects
GOsc ⊂ GO to every role scope sc ∈ SC; while keySC may only be assigned
to exactly one go ∈ GOall, every additional scope sc ∈ SC, sc 6= keySC may
be assigned to an arbitrary number of guarded objects go1, ..., gon ∈ GOall,
OSRAall denotes the set of all object-specific role assignments.
By incorporating organizational entities, a set of agents can be assigned to an
object-specific role assignment instead of being referenced directly. For example, an
organization role (e.g., a director) may be used to assign agents being directors in
an organization. Furthermore, new agents may be added to the organizational role
of a director without need to adjust the current object-specific role assignments.
Before creating an object-specific role assignment, it needs to be determined
which object-specific roles may be assigned to an agent or to organizational entities.
As discussed, only an object-specific role with a corresponding key scope or a valid
additional scope may be assigned to a given guarded object. By using different
scopes (cf. Definitions 4.3 and 4.4), an agent may obtain a range of object-specific
roles in relation to the guarded objects in an information system (cf. Fig. 7).
Review of Ina Kent's application
Recruitment Process #181
Application
Job Offer "Sales Manager"
...
ApplicationApplicationApplication of Kevin Smith
Review of Kevin Smith's application
Agent
Recruiter
(Object-aware Role)
Object-aware
Role Assignment #15
Reviewer 
(Object-aware Role)
Object-aware
Role Assignment #23
Fig. 7: Example of an Agent obtaining overlapping Object-Specific Roles
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For any guarded object, an agent may want to dynamically switch his role to
perform a desired action based on another object-specific role. Note that this aspect
is interwoven with the semantics of deliberately performing actions in different
roles. As a consequence, the user interface of the information system should allow
switching roles during run time (cf. Section 5).
In addition, the scope-related parameters (scpParams) of the referenced object-
specific role are crucial for creating object-specific role assignments. Accordingly,
they need to be carefully set to ensure the desired ORAC functionality at run time.
If parameter OnCreationDefault is set for the key scope of an object-specific role,
an object-specific role assignment will be automatically created for the agent who
intends to create a guarded object (cf. Requirement R07). In this context, the given
object-specific role and the guarded object are taken into account. Consequently,
if parameter OnGrantDefault is set for any scope, the role will be recommended
to the agent who wants to assign it to another agent (and organizational entity
respectively).
Finally, parameter ScopeManager indicates that an object-specific role has
the maximum number of privileges regarding the defined key scope. Obviously,
for every defined scope, there is exactly one object-specific role with parameter
ScopeManager. To support controlled ORAC, object-specific roles with parameter
ScopeManager may be utilized to support a review process regarding the cre-
ation or the update of an object-specific role assignment. For example, an agent
may want to assign a different object-specific role to another agent. Then, one or
several agents, who obtain an object-specific role with parameter ScopeManager
being assigned to a parental guarded object, take the decision whether or not the
object-specific role assignment can be created.
Besides the parameters of an object-specific role, the manual assignment of an
object-specific role to other agents can be controlled as well. First, the creation of
an object-specific role assignment in relation to a specific guarded object may be
limited by a dedicated privilege. In consequence, only those agents with an object-
specific role covering such a privilege may create an object-specific role assignment
linking an agent to an object-specific role in relation to a given guarded object.
Furthermore, an agent cannot assign any object-specific role with privileges other
than the ones the agent obtains with its current object-specific role assignment.
Once an object-specific role assignment is created, it is not supposed to be
adjusted at run time. However, if an organizational entity shall be changed, the
assignment may be adjusted without causing any problem. Hence, a review process
is needed. If an agent shall be added to an object-specific role assignment, the latter
may either be adjusted or an entirely new assignment be created. Note that such
a decision should follow a consistent policy. As the object-specific role assignment
would change its semantics , its referenced guarded object or linked object-specific
role must not be updated or replaced. Hence, if an agent wants to perform such
a change, a new object-specific role assignment has to be created, whereas the old
one needs to be deleted.
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5. Realizing Object-specific Role-based Access Control
To underline the benefits provided by ORAC, this section deals with the funda-
mental aspects of realizing object-specific role-based access control. In particular,
we address the necessary steps for setting up ORAC at design time and consider
its actual enforcement during run time.
As a prerequisite for ORAC, the object model including the guarded object
types and their relationship types need to be defined. Moreover, privileges need to
be specified in accordance with Definition 4.2. Based on these preparatory steps,
an object-specific role administrator to whom all privileges in relation to the in-
formation system are assigned needs to be defined. In this context, ORAC benefits
from a root guarded object type acting as the top of the emerging object model
instance. Considering the HR scenario, for example, an HR System guarded object
type may be introduced (cf. Fig. 8). Consequently, the key scope of object-specific
role administrator refers to the guarded object type HR System (as targetGOT ).
Recruitment Process
ApplicationJob Offer Contract Offer
      -  
[0-1] : 1       -  
      -        -  
1 : [0-1]
      -  
... ...
HR System
Fig. 8: Use of a Root Guarded Object (HR System)
After booting up an information system with integrated ORAC, an agent with
object-specific role administrator may first define other object-specific roles. For
example, an agent obtaining the object-specific role administrator in relation to the
guarded object HR System, may define the object-specific roles of a manager, re-
cruiter, and applicant. The ORAC-based system may thereby assist the administra-
tor to optimally cover all required privileges, e.g., through the proper visualization
of sets of privileges.
Once the object-specific roles have been set up and the information system is
running, the access to guarded objects needs to be properly checked. Note that
this constitutes a key feature of ORAC, integrating and interpreting all specified
components as well as the given object model instance in order to decide whether
an agent may access a specific action. For this purpose, the current object-specific
role assignment of the agent is determined. Two options exist to accomplish this:
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(1) The most specific role assignment is taken automatically. ORAC considers
the object-specific role assignments of the guarded object an action may
be performed on. If the current agent is referenced by one of these object-
specific role assignments, the latter will be further considered. If no object-
specific role assignment can be found, the procedure will be repeated for
the parental guarded objects of the given one until an object-specific role
assignment is found. If no object-specific role assignment can be found at
all, an error will be returned indicating that the action cannot be performed.
(2) The agent itself determines the current object-specific role assignment it
uses when interacting with the information system (e.g., via user interface).
This approach can be further improved as the most specific role assignment
is automatically determined and shown to the agent before invoking the
action. If there exist several possible object-specific role assignments, the
agent may still change the object-specific role assignment depending on
preferences.
After determining an object-specific role assignment, the actual access control
enabled through ORAC can be enforced based on the identified entities. The latter
encompass the given agent, object-specific role assignment, and required privilege
(to perform the desired action) as well as the guarded object the action shall be
performed on. To facilitate the understanding of realizing ORAC, the algorithm for
enforcing ORAC is shown in Listing 1 in pseudo code.
Listing 1: Enforce Object-specific Role-based Access Control
1 boolean enforceORAC ( Agent a , OSRA osra , P r i v i l e g e p , GO go ){
2 // go through a l l the scopes o f the r o l e ass ignment
3 f o r ( scgo : os ra . getSCGO ( ) ){
4 // cur rent scope r e f e r e n c e s the g iven guarded ob j e c t ?
5 i f ( scgo . getGO ( ) . equa l s ( go ) ){
6 // I s g iven p r i v i l e g e in s e t o f scope−s p e c i f i c p r i v i l e g e s ?
7 i f ( scgo . getScope ( ) . g e t S c o p e P r i v i l e g e s ( ) . conta in (p ) )
8 re turn t rue ;
9 }
10 e l s e {
11 // i s the go o f scgo a ( t r a n s i t i v e ) parent o f go?
12 boolean i sParent = isParentOf ( scgo . getGO ( ) , go ) ;
13 i f ( i sParent )
14 // I s g iven p r i v i l e g e in s e t o f h i e r a r c h i c a l p r i v i l e g e s ?
15 i f ( scgo . getScope ( ) . g e t H i e r a r c h P r i v i l e g e s ( ) . conta in (p ) )
16 re turn true ;
17 }
18 }
19 re turn f a l s e ;
20 }
The algorithm underlines that it has to be first examined whether the object-
specific role assignment directly references the given guarded object. Note that this
check has to be performed separately for every defined scope. If such a check is
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positive, the set of scope-related privileges is evaluated to check whether it contains
the required privilege. If the object-specific role assignment does not reference the
given guarded object, it has to be evaluated whether the object-specific role assign-
ment references any parental guarded object (isParentOf()). In this case, the set of
hierarchical privileges will be evaluated with respect to the required privilege.
To cope with changes at run time, ORAC have to feature a high degree of flexibil-
ity. For example, new object-specific roles may be added, existing ones be adjusted,
or object-specific role assignments be created, changed or removed (cf. Section 4.4).
As a major benefit of ORAC, the object-specific role assignments are indirectly
updated automatically as soon as privileges are added to or removed from a corre-
sponding object-specific role. This way, privileges can be quickly granted or removed
to any number of agents obtaining a particular object-specific role.
Due to the continuous updates of an information system, additional or changed
features typically result in new or updated privileges. Therefore, after booting up
the information system, the set of privileges and their relationship to object-specific
roles have to be re-evaluated to allow for an ORAC evolution (cf. Section 6).
6. Evaluation
To enable the use of the ORAC approach in various application domains as well as
to demonstrate its feasibility, we developed a proof-of-concept prototype. The latter
is based on state-of-the-art technologies that utilize the human resource application
scenario presented in Section 2. To underline the general applicability of ORAC,
we further conducted two case studies (cf. Section 6.2) in which we evaluate ORAC
with scenarios different from the one presented in Section 2.
6.1. Proof-of-Concept Prototype
To demonstrate the feasibility of the ORAC approach and to emphasize the integra-
bility with state-of-the-art concepts and technologies, a proof-of-concept prototype
was built based on a service-oriented architecture and the Java EE 7 platform. Its
architecture is shown in Fig. 9.
The prototype includes all entities of the ORAC approach as well as the algo-
rithm presented in Section 5. To demonstrate the ORAC functionality, we captured
the human resource application scenario presented in Section 2. Accordingly, the
ORAC prototype represents a lean human resource recruitment system, which is
protected by ORAC, featuring services to, for example, start recruitment processes,
add job offers, or update applications. To ease the demonstration of the prototype’s
capabilities, a specific use case service was implemented allowing for the quick cre-
ation of an exemplary recruitment process with many associated objects (e.g., a job
offer, applications). The executable source code of the proof-of-concept prototype as
well as detailed instructions regarding its usage can be found in a publicly available
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Fig. 9: Architecture of the ORAC Proof-of-Concept Prototype
repositoryc that is free to use.
To properly incorporate guarded object types (cf. Section 2.1) in the domain-
specific object model, we made use of the abstract base class GuardedObject, which
features an abstract method getParentGuardedObjects. Based on this approach, it
can be ensured that the parental guarded objects of a considered guarded object
can be always retrieved and checked for ORAC in a sound way (cf. Section 5). In
turn, privileges are specified in accordance with Definition 4.2. To exploit the tight
integration of privilege definitions and information system development, we relied
on Java annotations. In particular, all services in the application layer were enriched
with the annotation RequiresAccessControl as shown in Listing 2.
As advantage, Java reflections may be employed to gather all defined privi-
leges while starting the information system (cf. Requirement R02). Afterwards, the
persistence layer is queried to evaluate whether the privileges have been persisted
before. If not, all gathered privileges are persisted the first time. Alternatively, ex-
isting privileges, which were persisted before, are compared with the gathered ones
to derive necessary adaptations (i.e, adding new ones or removing existing ones).
Listing 2: Privilege Definition using Java Annotations
1 @RequiresAccessControl ( targetGuardedObjectType=Process . c l a s s ,
2 contextGuardedObjectType=Workspace . c l a s s , actionType=’ADD’ )
3 pub l i c Process addProcess ( Long agentId , Long osraId ,
4 Long workspaceId , Process newProcess ) {
5 . . .
6 }
The second benefit of annotations comes into play when enforcing access control
at run time. Assume that object-specific roles have been created and privileges
have already been allocated to them. Then, an agent obtaining an object-specific
role through a corresponding role assignment may perform an action. For example,
chttps://bitbucket.org/dbis/orac-prototype/overview
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the agent may want to add a new (recruitment) process (cf. Listing 2). As soon
as the call of the client is approaching the application service annotated with the
RequiresAccessControl annotation, the call is interrupted with a Java interceptor
enforcing access control. Figure 10 shows the procedure of enforcing ORAC with
the help of an interceptor.
Client
(Agent with OARA)
ORAC 
Interceptor
Application
Services
ORAC
Services
call addProcess(...)
enforceORAC(...)
If access check ok: call addProcess()
method result
If process created: check whether new role assignment required
method result
if access check failed: access denied
access control response
Fig. 10: Enforcing ORAC with an Interceptor
For enforcing ORAC, the interceptor may use the parameters passed to the appli-
cation service. Regarding the addProcess service (cf. Listing 2), the interceptor takes
the identifier of the current agent (agentId), the identifier of the given object-specific
role assignment (osraId), and the identifier of the workspace (workspaceId) into ac-
count to retrieve the agent, the object-specific role assignment and the guarded object
of interest (workspace with id workspaceId). Using these entities, the algorithm from
Listing 1 is executed to decide whether the desired action may be performed. If ac-
cess is granted and the addProcess service is successfully executed afterwards, the
interceptor may asynchronously trigger an ORAC service checking whether a new
object-specific role assignment needs to be created for the considered agent and the
recently created recruitment process (cf. Section 4.4). In consequence, Requirement
R07 is properly addressed by the ORAC implementation at run time.
Overall, the developed proof-of-concept prototype demonstrates that the ORAC
approach can be well integrated into the design and run time of an information
system relying on state-of-the-art technologies. Notably, the presented implemen-
tation relies on convention over configuration principle: the RequiresAccessControl
annotations as well as the signature of the specific services need to be coherently
defined by developers. The presented interceptor may then easily enforce object-
specific role-based access control, which is independent from the specific imple-
mentations of the application services. Thereby, an aspect-oriented integration of
ORAC can be achieved to prevent developers from mixing functional source code
with authorization-related one.
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6.2. Case Studies
We conducted two case studies to demonstrate the applicability of ORAC. For both
case studies, we analyzed the application scenarios at hand as well as an existing
information system in order to take the current support into account. Thereupon,
we investigate the applicability of ORAC regarding the encountered scenarios. In
the scope of the first case study, we analyzed auctioning processes14 and a web-based
auctioning systemd. In the second case study, we analyzed the general particularities
of project management23 and a common open source project management systeme.
Case Study 6.1. (Auctioning) If someone wants to auction off an article
in an auctioning system, she typically signs into an auctioning system as a user
and then creates an offer in certain category of the auction system (cf. Fig. 11).
When creating the offer, the user is linked to the offer as a vendor. Usually, an
offer (object) contains various attributes, e.g., starting price or payment terms.
In addition, the offer comprises a child object product description with various
attributes such as the product description or pictures of the product. If a user
of the auctioning system is interested in purchasing the offered product, he will
make a tender and, consequently, a bid object is created in relation to the offer
object. Furthermore, the user who has given a tender now acts as a bidder in
relation to the offer (object). As soon as auctioning has come to an end, the
user who has issued the highest bid will act as a buyer in relation to the offer.
1 : 11 : [0-∞)
1 : [0-∞)
1 : [0-∞)
1 : [1-∞)Auc�oning Service User
Category
Offer
Product Descrip�onBid
1 : 1
Payment Terms
1 : [0-∞) ...
Fig. 11: Case Study Auctioning Service
Studying the auctioning case and its properties in detail shows that ORAC
is able to support the application scenario well. Regarding the auctioning system
(key scope), at least two object-specific roles are required: user and administrator.
Further, there are three object-specific roles for guarded objects of type offer (key
scope): vendor, bidder, and buyer. In the role of a vendor, users may update their
dwww.phpprobid.com
ewww.openproject.com
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offer and see the details of every issued bid (hierarchical privileges). In turn, a user
assigned as a bidder may see some more details of the offer and the details of his
bids. Thus, the object-specific role bidder requires an additional scope regarding
the guarded object type bid. Finally, a user assigned as a vendor to an object of
type offer, may see further details of the offer, e.g, payment terms as well as the
bids he issued for the offer (additional scope).
Case Study 6.2. (Project Management) In a project management sys-
tem (cf. Fig. 12), a project is created and used to increase the awareness and
transparency for project stakeholders, to support project managers in coordi-
nating the involved persons more effectively, and to keep track of the project
progress in order to ensure the quality of work results. Therefore, a user of a
project management system may create a project in order to act as a project
admin afterwards. Using the created project, various subordinated project-
related entities (e.g., milestones, phases, or tasks) are added or updated to
document and manage the progress of the project. To enable collaboration
among project participants, the latter are added by the project admin to the
project. Then, they may act as project members in relation to the (virtual)
project. As a result, the project admin may assign tasks to project members
on demand in order to coordinate work, to document the assignments, and to
eventually achieve the objectives together.
1 : [0-∞)
1 : [0-∞)
1 : [0-∞)
1 : [0-∞)
1 : [1-∞)Project Mgmt System User
Project
Milestone
FileFile
Task
1 : [0-∞)
1 : [0-∞)
...
File
1 : [0-∞)
1 : [0-∞)
Fig. 12: Case Study Project Management
Analyzing the project management case show that the project management
system also employs different roles that can be well supported by ORAC. In par-
ticular, the system provides—similar to the auctioning service—the two roles user
and administrator on “system level”. Hence, ORAC can easily match these roles
with object-specific ones targeting the project management system. Furthermore,
project management employs the project-specific roles project admin, project mem-
ber, and project reader. Interestingly, the project management system also enables
administrators to create roles specific to work packages. Note that these roles fea-
February 2, 2019 21:22 Object-specific Role-based Access Control docu-
ment
26 Nicolas Mundbrod and Manfred Reichert
ture a scope as well (e.g., objects of type project). However, the roles cannot support
the hierarchical application of privileges or an overlapping of roles. In ORAC, an
agent may concurrently obtain both the roles of a system user and a project mem-
ber. Finally, the definition and use of roles are customized and wired in the project
management system, i.e., it does not rely on a generic approach like ORAC.
ORAC is capable of widely supporting both auctioning processes and project
management scenarios with their access control requirements. Through object-
specific roles and role assignments, users may be accurately given access to the
objects they own as well as to the corresponding actions they may execute. More-
over, the typical roles, which are required in both case studies, can be well supported
by object-specific roles. However, there exist specific requirements which may re-
quire system-specific adjustments to the generic ORAC approach. In the auctioning
case, for example, an object-specific role assignment (to object-specific role buyer)
must be created automatically for the user who has issued the highest bid.
7. Related Work
RBAC25,7 is the most commonly known access control approach. In RBAC, roles are
allocated to users and every role is connected with a set of privileges (often called
permissions). However, the privileges of traditional RBAC are not made explicit. In-
stead, for every action there is a list of roles that may execute it. Consequently, in the
source code of an information system, it is frequently checked whether the subject,
who intends to perform an action, has roles granting the action. As common bene-
fits, RBAC is appreciated for its simplicity and ease of manageability. Furthermore,
one can audit which resources and functions are accessible by which roles. As major
drawbacks, RBAC lacks a fine-grained access control (cf. Section 1) and, as a result,
scalability becomes an issue due to the tremendous number of roles that may have
to be managed. In particular, RBAC neither allows for object-/instance-specific ac-
cess control nor can it deal with dynamically changing environment attributes (e.g.,
time of day and current location of a subject).
Numerous adaptations of RBAC have been proposed to address these shortcom-
ings. First, an approach providing parameterized privileges and role templates was
proposed9; a role is limited to only access a subset of objects based on the instanti-
ated parameters. Expanding this basic concept of configuration through parameters,
parameterized role-based access control approaches1,8 aim to overcome the explo-
sion of dedicated roles and to enable a more fine-grained access control. However, the
approach suffers from the complex assignment of subjects to the parameterized roles
at run time. Furthermore, with increasing number of parameters, the management
of parameterized role instances becomes challenging. An approach to use attributes
for the automated assignment of users to roles was proposed in literature2. Note
that in combination with parameterized roles, the integrated management of roles,
parameters, attributes, and rules constitutes an even bigger challenge for managing
and realizing proper access control policies.
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Integrating RBAC with the object-oriented paradigm, the approach of object-
oriented role-based access control4 was proposed to control information flows within
object-oriented systems. The key idea is to control information flows among objects,
which may be dynamically created or removed. Objects obtain roles that equip them
with privileges enabling and limiting the access to other objects. Finally, another
approach17,3 addresses the integration of RBAC in a distributed object-aware pro-
cess management system to enable fine-grained access control. The approach is
limited to five key privileges and focuses on the integration of the objects’ attribute
values and states with access control decisions.
Overall, the above-mentioned approaches address parts of an object-specific role-
based access control, but lack an integrated view on subjects, privileges, object-
specific roles, assignments, and objects. ORAC exclusively provides the integration
of hierarchical privileges (cf. Requirement R05) and the support of different role
scopes (cf. Section 4.3) to optimally support dynamic object model instances.
To address the limitations of RBAC-based approaches, several approaches pro-
pose attribute-based access control (ABAC) 20,6,13,10. With ABAC, no roles have
to be defined up-front—at least as long as role names are not used as attributes. In-
stead, policies are defined based on the attributes of the subjects and the resources
to be accessed13. Consequently, ABAC enables an expressive, fine-grained access
control based on rules evaluating attributes. Listing 3 shows an example of a policy
expressed in the terms of the Abbreviated Language for Authorization (ALFA)f to
specify the access of recruiters to the recruitment process.
Listing 3: Simplified Declaration of an ABAC Policy
1 p o l i c y a c c e s s R e c r u i t e r {
2 t a r g e t c l a u s e user . department == HR and user . type == employee
3 . . .
4 r u l e al lowReadUpdateAccessToRecruitmentProcess{
5 t a r g e t c l a u s e objectType == ” RecruitmentProcess ”
6 cond i t i on rec ru i tmentProce s s . a s s i g n e d R e c r u i t e r == user . id
7 permit
8 }
9 r u l e al lowReadUpdateAccessToApplication {
10 t a r g e t c l a u s e ( ac t i on == ” read ” or ac t i on == ”update ”)
11 and objectType == ” Appl i ca t ion ”
12 cond i t i on a p p l i c a t i o n . r ec ru i tmentProce s s . a s s i g n e d R e c r u i t e r
13 == user . id
14 permit
15 }
16 . . .
17 }
As illustrated in Listing 3, for every object type corresponding policy rules need
to be defined in ABAC. In a more complex scenario, each of the potentially large set
of policies might comprise a high number of rules to accommodate the attributes in
fhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ALFA_(XACML)
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the access control decisions. Furthermore, if a user fills several roles in a information
system (e.g., manager and recruiter), the possible roles and their privileges are
encoded across rules and with attributes of object types (e.g., assignedRecruiter).
To define the required policies and rules, a detailed understanding of the objects,
the attributes and the business processes are needed. As a result, users themselves
cannot easily allocate privileges to roles (cf. Requirements R01 and R02).
To properly determine the privileges a specific group of users (i.e., a role) shall
obtain, the relevant rules need to be first identified. Moreover, considerable domain
knowledge is necessary to correctly analyze the identified rules. However, to deter-
mine a subject’s set of privileges in respect to a running information system, the
full set of access rules needs to be instantiated with subject and object attributes5.
In comparison, in ORAC, the set of object-specific role assignments may be used
to derive the roles an agent obtains in relation to given objects.
To enhance the comparison, the hierarchy of objects in an object model instance
cannot be easily incorporated in ABAC. Instead, it must be statically described with
the help of object attributes (cf. condition of rule allowReadUpdateAccessToAppli-
cation). For an unlimited hierarchy of objects (e.g., a growing tree structure), it is
not possible to adequately specify a rule comparable to the one presented in Listing
3. In ORAC, corresponding privileges are linked to the set of hierarchical privileges
of an object-specific role (cf. Requirement R05), and the given object hierarchy is
dynamically resolved at run time. ORAC significantly differs from ABAC through
the availability and provision of roles (which are important in many information
systems), the rather simple assignment of pre-specified privileges to object-specific
roles (instead of powerful rules using any kind of attributes), and the integration of
the hierarchy of objects into the access control approach.
Finally, there exist various approaches that combine role- with attribute-based
access control, e.g., by constraining the set of privileges allocated to a role by
the usage of attributes at run time15. In particular, constraint rules incorporating
current attribute values determine the privileges to be excluded. A formal model
constraining role privileges via rules that evaluate attributes was proposed12. This
role-centric attribute-based access control (RABAC) extends RBAC with privilege
filtering policies.
8. Conclusion
We presented an approach for realizing an object-specific role-based access con-
trol (ORAC), which enables the support of sophisticated scenarios with complex
object models. The approach was established by gathering the key use cases and re-
quirements in relation to object-specific access control in contemporary information
systems. Based on a solid formal foundation, ORAC allows for the rich modeling
of object-specific roles by allocating object-related as well as hierarchical privileges
at both design and run time. Especially, this privilege allocation enables users to
dynamically access created objects without any changes to be applied to ORAC
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itself. To enforce access control at run time, the creation of object-specific role as-
signments can be controlled by configuration parameters and safety checks (is an
agent allowed to assign a role). The proof-of-concept implementation demonstrated
the feasibility of ORAC and emphasized the benefits of integrating ORAC based
on state-of-the-art technologies (annotations, interceptors). Finally, to evaluate the
practical applicability of ORAC, it was applied in two application scenarios in the
shape of case studies.
In future research, we will perform experiments using the prototype to evaluate
the scalability of ORAC in larger scenarios. In this context, we will examine the
impact of caching and indexing guarded object instances in order to optimize the
process of retrieving parental object instances at run time.
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